Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets
- 1 September 2011
- journal article
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Economics
- Vol. 3 (1), 579-600
- https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080310
Abstract
We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken in the recent literature.Keywords
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