A Theory of Political Transitions
- 1 September 2001
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in The American Economic Review
- Vol. 91 (4), 938-963
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.938
Abstract
We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity cost is low, for example, during recessions. The threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive, and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy, and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility. (JEL D72, D74, O15, P16)Keywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political UnrestThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social ContractAmerican Economic Review, 2000
- Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political InstabilityComparative Political Studies, 1999
- Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and GrowthJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- What Makes Democracies Endure?Journal of Democracy, 1996
- Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History AnalysisAmerican Political Science Review, 1995
- THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS AND ECONOMIC-GROWTH - WHY DOES CAPITAL FLOW FROM POOR TO RICH COUNTRIESJournal of Political Economy, 1992
- Rationalizing Revolutionary IdeologyEconometrica, 1985
- A Rational Theory of the Size of GovernmentJournal of Political Economy, 1981
- The paradox of revolutionPublic Choice, 1971