Diversity and Dissent in the Social Sciences
- 8 September 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 41 (4), 470-494
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393110381212
Abstract
I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists’ recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars’ concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approaches will lead to fragmentation and the assumption that an imposed consensus on a theoretical approach is needed to maintain the unity of the discipline.Keywords
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