The Effects of Redistricting on Incumbents
- 1 December 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Mary Ann Liebert Inc in Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy
- Vol. 11 (4), 490-502
- https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2012.0152
Abstract
We analyze the effects of redistricting on the electoral fortunes of incumbent legislators, using voting data on U.S. congressional districts, state legislative districts, and statewide races. We find little evidence that redistricting helps incumbents in U.S. legislative elections. If anything, redrawing district lines reduces the average vote margin of those in districted offices compared with offices that are not districted, reduces electoral security, and increases turnover in the legislature.Keywords
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