Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration
- 1 November 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (4), 1409-1471
- https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1409
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections. In the model, districting matters because it determines the seat-vote curve, which describes the relationship between seats and votes. The paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve and shows that, under a weak condition, there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship. The paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat-vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting. This is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s.This publication has 32 references indexed in Scilit:
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