Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law
- 1 July 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 48 (3), 221-241
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00217-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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