Some economic costs of corruption in LDCs
- 1 October 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 27 (1), 89-97
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389008422184
Abstract
It has often been argued that bribery creates auction‐like conditions and, hence, improves the allocative efficiency of bureaucratic decisions. This article shows that these auction‐like conditions are not likely to exist because officials will restrict access to bribery in order to reduce the risks of detection. Alternatively, officials may engage in supply‐stretching whose long‐term costs are likely to outweigh any gains in allocative efficiency. It is also shown that bribery may impose other costs resulting from the efforts of officials to create or augment the opportunities for receiving bribes.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- The state and economic stagnation in Tropical AfricaWorld Development, 1986
- The market for public office: Why the Indian state is not better at developmentWorld Development, 1985
- PUBLIC UTILITIES IN EGALITARIAN LDC's: THE ROLE OF BRIBERY IN ACHIEVING PARETO EFFICIENCYKyklos, 1981
- Corruption and developmentWorld Development, 1979
- Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary AnalysisComparative Politics, 1972
- Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration, Development, and Corruption in the New StatesPublic Administration Review, 1968
- The Effects of Corruption in a Developing NationThe Western Political Quarterly, 1966
- Economic Development Through Bureaucratic CorruptionAmerican Behavioral Scientist, 1964