Direct and Market Effects of Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: An Experimental Analysis
- 1 January 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Since firms in an emissions trading program are linked together through a permit market, so too are their compliance choices. Thus, enforcement strategies for tKeywords
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