Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking
- 1 October 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 61 (2), 199-216
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.007
Abstract
No abstract availableOther Versions
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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