Does corporate governance affect financial communication transparency? Empirical evidence in the Tunisian context
Open Access
- 10 November 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in Cogent Economics & Finance
Abstract
The present study is focused on investigating the relationship between intentional governance mechanisms (Directors’ boards, Ownership structure and audit quality) and financial communication transparency. For this purpose, a model is used and applied to Tunisian firms’ sample observed over the period 2006–2013. The achieved results reveal that intentional governance mechanisms are positively related to a higher transparency level noticeable in financial communication (voluntary disclosure and quality information). In addition, empirical tests indicate that financial communication transparency is highly dependent on the board size, ownership concentration, as well as on audit quality.Keywords
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