Board Composition and Corporate Fraud
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in CFA Magazine
- Vol. 60 (3), 33-43
- https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v60.n3.2619
Abstract
The study reported here examined how various characteristics of the board of directors and other governance features affected the occurrence of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1978–2001 period. The findings suggest that board composition and the structure of a board's oversight committees are significantly correlated with the incidence of corporate fraud. In the sample, as the number of independent outside directors increased on a board and in the board's audit and compensation committees, the likelihood of corporate wrongdoing decreased.Keywords
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