Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms
Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Journal of Governance and Regulation
- Vol. 1 (4), 100-116
- https://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v1_i4_c1_p1
Abstract
The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.Keywords
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