Agency Conflicts, Controlling Owner Proximity, and Firm Value: An Analysis of Dual‐Class Firms in the United States
- 23 March 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 18 (2), 124-135
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00783.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 42 references indexed in Scilit:
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