Testing for Offsetting Behavior and Adverse Recruitment Among Drivers of Airbag‐Equipped Vehicles
- 17 November 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 70 (4), 629-650
- https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0022-4367.2003.00068.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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