Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment
- 1 April 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 109 (2), 444-453
- https://doi.org/10.1086/319557
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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