Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion

Abstract

The existing literature on supply chain information sharing assumes that information is shared truthfully. Unless each party can verify the authenticity of the other party's information, manufacturers and retailers may divulge false information for their own benefit. These information distortions may reduce the benefit levels or even stop information sharing in supply chains. We analyze the incentives for manufacturers and retailers within a supply chain to distort information when they share it and propose a mechanism that results in truthful information sharing. We consider a make-to-order supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer set prices based on their private forecasts of uncertain demand. If both parties share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits; however, the retailer benefits only if the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price when information is shared compared to when information is not shared. However, we show that the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively, have an incentive to overstate and understate their forecasts while sharing information. The information distortion phenomenon is the direct result of each party exploiting its private information to appropriate the gains from information sharing. We show that the incentives to distort information are eliminated and both parties benefit from information sharing if the manufacturer and the retailer can agree on their relative profit margins prior to information sharing.