Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- 30 November 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 73 (2), 595-607
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.009
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with ContractsEconometrica, 2007
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interestsJournal of Economic Theory, 2005
- On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate PartiesEconometrica, 2002
- Bargaining and ReputationEconometrica, 2000
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run PlayersEconometrica, 1997
- Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 1997
- Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated GamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1996
- Reputation in Perturbed Repeated GamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1996
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived OpponentEconometrica, 1996
- Cooperation and bounded recallGames and Economic Behavior, 1989