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Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games
Home
Publications
Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games
Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games
Masaki Aoyagi
Masaki Aoyagi
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1 November 1996
journal article
Published by
Elsevier BV
in
Journal of Economic Theory
Vol. 71
(2)
,
378-393
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0126
Abstract
No abstract available
Keywords
REPUTATION
STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP
REPEATED GAMES
DYNAMIC STACKELBERG
INFINITELY REPEATED
Cited by 23 articles