Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory
- 11 September 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 51 (3), 271-293
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00201
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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