Discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions
Open Access
- 1 September 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 42 (1), 63-104
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00871-b
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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