When Does Information about Probability Count in Choices Under Risk?
- 8 December 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 26 (6), 1623-1636
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00847.x
Abstract
The question addressed in the present research is whether in naturalistic risky decision environments people are sensitive to information about the probability parameter. In Study 1, we showed that in naturalistic scenarios participants generally revealed little interest in obtaining information about the outcomes and probabilities. Moreover, participants asked fewer questions about probabilities for scenarios containing moral considerations. In Study 2, it was shown that, when supplied with information on probabilities, people could be sensitive to this information. This sensitivity depends on two factors. People were less sensitive to probabilities in scenarios perceived as containing ethical considerations. People were also less sensitive to probabilities when they were faced with a single‐choice situation than when they were faced with a series of lotteries with different probabilities. This can be accounted for in terms of the evaluability principle.Keywords
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