Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk‐Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects
- 1 March 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Financial Management
- Vol. 34 (1), 21-60
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00091.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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