What Really Matters in Auction Design
- 1 February 2002
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 16 (1), 169-189
- https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166
Abstract
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”Keywords
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