Practical evaluation of security for quantum key distribution
- 7 August 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 74 (2), 022307
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.74.022307
Abstract
Many papers have proven the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems in the asymptotic framework. The degree of the security has not been discussed in the finite coding-length framework, sufficiently. However, to guarantee any implemented QKD system required, it is needed to evaluate a protocol with a finite coding length. For this purpose, we derive a tight upper bound of the eavesdropper’s information. This bound is better than existing bounds. We also obtain the exponential rate of the eavesdropper’s information. Further, we approximate our bound by using the normal distribution.Keywords
Other Versions
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