Unconditional security in quantum cryptography
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2001
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Journal of the ACM
- Vol. 48 (3), 351-406
- https://doi.org/10.1145/382780.382781
Abstract
Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.Keywords
Other Versions
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