Dividend Initiations and Asymmetric Information: A Hazard Model
- 15 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Financial Review
- Vol. 38 (3), 351-368
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6288.00050
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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