Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
- 30 June 1984
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 13 (2), 187-221
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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