Carbon allowance auction design of China's emissions trading scheme: A multi-agent-based approach
- 1 March 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Energy Policy
- Vol. 102, 30-40
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.041
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Program on Key Research Project of China (2016YFF0204400)
- National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars (71025005)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71433001, 71301006, 71203214)
- National Program for Support of Top-notch Young Professionals
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities in BUCT
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