Rationality and Psychology in International Politics
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 59 (01), 77-106
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818305050058
Abstract
The ubiquitous yet inaccurate belief in international relations scholarship that cognitive biases and emotion cause only mistakes distorts the field's understanding of the relationship between rationality and psychology in three ways. If psychology explains only mistakes (or deviations from rationality), then (1) rationality must be free of psychology; (2) psychological explanations require rational baselines; and (3) psychology cannot explain accurate judgments. This view of the relationship between rationality and psychology is coherent and logical, but wrong. Although undermining one of these three beliefs is sufficient to undermine the others, I address each belief—or myth—in turn. The point is not that psychological models should replace rational models, but that no single approach has a lock on understanding rationality. In some important contexts (such as in strategic choice) or when using certain concepts (such as trust, identity, justice, or reputation), an explicitly psychological approach to rationality may beat a rationalist one.I thank Deborah Avant, James Caporaso, James Davis, Bryan Jones, Margaret Levi, Peter Liberman, Lisa Martin, Susan Peterson, Jason Scheideman, Jack Snyder, Michael Taylor, two anonymous reviewers, and especially Robert Jervis and Elizabeth Kier for their thoughtful comments and critiques. Jason Scheideman also helped with research assistance.Keywords
This publication has 54 references indexed in Scilit:
- Prejudice From Thin AirPsychological Science, 2004
- The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional RelationshipsInternational Security, 2000
- When are we better than them and they worse than us? A closer look at social discrimination in positive and negative domains.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000
- Folk Psychology and Cognitive ArchitecturePhilosophy of Science, 1995
- The Affections and the PassionsRationality and Society, 1993
- Everything You Know Is WrongContemporary Psychology, 1992
- Beyond DeterrenceJournal of Social Issues, 1987
- Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of EmbeddednessAmerican Journal of Sociology, 1985
- Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and BiasesScience, 1974
- Experiments in Intergroup DiscriminationScientific American, 1970