Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture
- 1 June 1995
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 62 (2), 179-196
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289851
Abstract
It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a “minimalist” construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.Keywords
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