Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Open Access
- 8 March 2006
- journal article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 7 (3), 271-291
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-005-0009-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- Valuing Climate ChangePublished by Informa UK Limited ,2013
- Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-MakingSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problemResource and Energy Economics, 2003
- Equity, Development, and Climate Change ControlJournal of the European Economic Association, 2003
- Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate CooperationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
- Game Theory and International Environmental CooperationPublished by Edward Elgar Publishing ,2001
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalitiesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1997
- A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollutionInternational Tax and Public Finance, 1995
- Self-Enforcing International Environmental AgreementsOxford Economic Papers, 1994
- Strategies for the international protection of the environmentJournal of Public Economics, 1993