Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
- 27 August 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 25 (4), 299-327
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0928-7655(03)00041-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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