Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's Dilemma
- 21 June 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 303, 119-127
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.014
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
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