Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails
- 7 January 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 256 (1), 45-57
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Institutes of Health (R01GM078986)
- John Templeton Foundation
- National Science Foundation
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