Stock Options and the Corporate Demand for Insurance
- 1 June 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Vol. 73 (2), 231-260
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2006.00172.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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