Revenue maximization with a single sample
- 1 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 91, 318-333
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.011
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- ONR
- NSF (CCF-0448664, CCF-1016885)
- ONR
- ONR
- AFOSR
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Stanford Graduate Fellowship
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