Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: evidence from Madagascar
- 22 November 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 41 (6), 507-517
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00462.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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