Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
- 1 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 111 (5), 1043-1075
- https://doi.org/10.1086/376950
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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