Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India
- 31 March 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 82 (2), 464-484
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.04.001
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
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