Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
- 30 September 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Economics Letters
- Vol. 84 (3), 399-405
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.011
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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