Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks
- 1 September 2005
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed. General issues associated with applying these principles in practice are identified. Examples of the actual application of incentive regulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for "unbundled" transmission and distribution networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric distribution and transmission networks is reviewed. Issues for future research are identified.Keywords
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