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Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
Home
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Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
Antonio Romero-Medina
Antonio Romero-Medina
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1 March 1998
journal article
Published by
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
in
Review of Economic Design
Vol. 3
(2)
,
137-147
https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050009
Abstract
No abstract available
Keywords
IMPLEMENTATION
MARKET
LIST
ADMISSION
EQUILIBRIUM
PREFERENCES
MANIPULATION
NASH
REVERSE
STRATEGIC
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