Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach
- 1 January 2008
- journal article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in The International Journal of Accounting
- Vol. 43 (2), 184-206
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2008.04.005
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 62 references indexed in Scilit:
- How Disaggregation Enhances the Credibility of Management Earnings ForecastsJournal of Accounting Research, 2007
- Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?Journal of Accounting Research, 2004
- Long Cheap TalkEconometrica, 2003
- Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock ReturnsJournal of Accounting Research, 2003
- Dealing with Stakeholders: How Reputation, Credibility and Framing Influence the GameCorporate Reputation Review, 2003
- Political CorrectnessJournal of Political Economy, 2001
- Credibility of Voluntary DisclosureThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2000
- News Management and the Value of FirmsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1994
- Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of ManagersJournal of Accounting Research, 1988
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970