Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly: Can highly simplified game theory models provide reliable policy insights?
- 1 June 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 90, 68-76
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.02.011
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 51 references indexed in Scilit:
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