Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2006
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 121 (2), 505-540
- https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505
Abstract
Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g., the cost of ink for a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, firKeywords
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