Corporate control and management compensation: Evidence on the agency problem
- 1 March 1988
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 9 (1), 21-25
- https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090090102
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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