What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives
Open Access
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 52 (3), 341-377
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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