Representative democracy and capital taxation
- 1 September 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 55 (1), 53-70
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90080-9
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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