Levels of Disconfirmability and Social Psychological Theory: A Response to Greenwald

Abstract

Greenwald (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 490-499) has proposed that social psychologists' failure to unequivocally decide between dissonance and selfperception in the area of counterattitudinal advocacy may be traced to the fact that, because operational definitions within the area are not well-established, the theories are only operationally, but not conceptually disconfirmable. According to Greenwald, operationally disconfirmable theories are not necessarily disconfirmed by negative empirical evidence and can not be subjected to test in crucial experiments. An examination of this notion in light of the philosophy of science reveals it to be unfounded. It is concluded that a stalemate between competing theoretical orientations can not be accounted for in terms of the disconfirmability-level of the theories involved.