Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance
Top Cited Papers
- 28 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 64 (5), 2221-2256
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01499.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 60 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Life Cycle of Hedge Funds: Fund Flows, Size and PerformanceSSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
- Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and IncentivesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
- Hedge Funds with StyleThe Journal of Portfolio Management, 2003
- Altering the terms of executive stock optionsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and IncentivesThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
- Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund IndustryThe Journal of Finance, 1996
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate MergersThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1981